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Stock Liquidity and the Pricing of Earnings: 
A Comparison of China’s Floating and Non-floating Shares 
 
Abstract 
 
The reform to convert non-floating shares to floating in China provides a setting in which shares 
are subject to different liquidity constraint. We show that the severity of this constraint is 
inversely related to the extent to which earnings information is reflected in the share prices. 
Specifically, before the reform, the transfer prices of non-floating shares reflect much less 
earnings information than the market prices of floating shares. After the reform, however, both 
types of transfer reflect more earnings information, although the weights are still less than that 
found in the market prices. Thus, China's unique setting shows that share liquidity affects the 
way earnings are priced in stock. 
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Stock Liquidity and the Pricing of Earnings: 
 A Comparison of China’s Floating and Non-floating Shares 
 
I. Introduction 
This study compares the pricing mechanisms of two classes of stock in China: floating 
shares that are exchanged on the stock market and non-floating shares that can only be 
transferred between government agencies or corporations. This split share structure system is one 
of the unique features of China’s fledgling stock market. Non-floating shares have exactly the 
same voting and cash flow rights as floating shares, but can only be transferred between 
government agencies or corporations through private negotiation. Silber (1991) documents 
significant price differences between restricted securities which can be sold only after a two-year 
holding period and publicly traded securities of the same company in the US. Thus we expect 
China’s floating and non-floating shares to have different pricing mechanisms and very different 
price levels since they have very different trading liquidity. 
We examine how earnings information is incorporated in the prices of different types of 
stock in China. Non-floating shares in China are classified into “state shares” and “legal-person 
shares.” State shares are held by a government agency or a state-owned enterprise (SOE), and 
their transfer requires governmental approval as well as regulations on the level of transfer 
prices. Legal-person (LP) shares, on the other hand, are held by township and village enterprises, 
privately-owned enterprises, and foreign companies, and their transfer does not require 
government approval or price regulations. Together with the market prices of floating shares 
observed from the stock exchanges, this setting allows us to identify transactions that are subject 
to three distinct levels of liquidity. On one extreme is the transfer of state shares that is subject to 
state approval and regulations on prices. Lying in the middle is the transfer of legal-person shares 
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between private entities, which is free from government intervention but subject to severe 
illiquidity. On the other extreme is the trading of floating shares in the open market that is least 
constrained by illiquidity. 
The distinction of liquidity has reduced significantly after a reform to convert non-
floating shares to floating initiated by the Chinese government in 2005. The split share structure 
reform makes both the state shares and LP shares floating within one to three years, depending 
on the percentage owned by their shareholders. In addition, the transfer of state shares is no 
longer subject to governmental approval. Thus, within three years after the reform, the transfers 
of state shares and LP shares are still subject to certain sale restrictions. The liquidity difference 
between state and LP shares and the original floating shares is lower but still exists after the 
reform. Thus, by comparing different price mechanisms before and after the reform under 
different levels of trading restrictions and illiquidity constraints, we shed light on the impact of 
stock liquidity on the pricing of earnings in China’s stock market. 
The market prices that are observed from China’s stock market provide an interesting 
benchmark to compare the ability of the transfer prices to reflect individual firm’s fundamentals 
because stock prices in China continue to exhibit the highest synchronicity among the markets 
around the world (Morck et al. 2000 and Durnev et al. 2004). Durnev et al. (2004) take this as 
evidence that reforms in China have been least effective at creating functionally efficient stock 
markets. Other studies show that when stock prices are more synchronous, they are less likely to 
reflect information about future earnings (Durnev et al. 2003). Thus, China’s stock market is 
expected to be “poor” in its ability to impound earnings information, and the market prices 
provide a very low benchmark for assessing transfer prices. It remains an empirical question that 
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whether they can better reflect the earnings information than the transfer prices of illiquid non-
floating shares. 
Using a sample of 1,501 share transfers in China’s stock markets in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen from 1998 to 2008, we show that despite the immaturity of China’s stock market, the 
market prices generally reflect part of past or future earnings information. However, before the 
reform, the transfer prices of non-floating state shares are based primarily on the book value of 
net assets without considering earnings and the quality of assets. Earnings are priced only in the 
transfers of LP shares, which are not constrained by state regulation and control. However, due 
to the illiquidity of shares, the weight of earnings in valuation is much less in transfer prices than 
in the market prices of floating shares. In comparison, after the reform, the transfer prices of both 
state shares and LP shares incorporate book value and earnings information because there are no 
more governmental approval and price regulations on state shares. However, due to the holding 
period restriction of state and LP shares, the weight of earnings in valuations is still less in 
transfer prices than in the market prices of original floating shares. In summary, the Chinese 
setting provides evidence that government involvement and market forces play opposite roles in 
generating a price that can reflect earnings information. 
Although the issues of China’s non-floating shares that are studied in this paper are quite 
distinct, they are related to previous research. Silber (1991) examines the extent of illiquidity 
discount of restricted shares that can be sold only after a two-year period. The study shows that 
the discount varies directly with the number of restricted shares related to that of publicly traded 
shares and inversely with the credit-worthiness of the issuing firm. Even credit-worthy firms 
need to offer price discount of more than 30 percent to sell a significant block of restricted 
shares. Longstaff (1995) uses an analytical model to show that the illiquidity discount is a 
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function of the duration of the sale restriction and the variation in the prices of unrestricted 
shares. Using price data of restricted shares in China, Chen and Xiong (2002) show that the 
illiquidity discount increases with the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio and its floating shares’ volatility, 
and decreases with firm size, return on equity and the floating shares’ book-to-market ratio. For a 
sample of U.S. biotechnology companies, Hand (2005) finds that the degrees and signs of the 
association between financial statement data and equity value are similar in open stock markets 
and private venture capital markets. However, Hand does not compare the relative importance of 
earnings and book value in public and private markets. In addition, the venture capital market is 
very different from China’s non-floating stock market, as the shares that are exchanged in the 
venture market are much closer to being floating on the open market than China’s non-floating 
shares. Our setting of China’s non-floating shares is useful to further understand the impact of 
illiquidity on the pricing mechanism of shares. 
Our findings have important implications related to two fundamental functions of a stock 
market: to motivate managers to create value for shareholders and to discipline poor performance 
through a takeover mechanism. If the transfer prices of non-floating shares do not reflect 
earnings information, the holders of these shares do not benefit directly from an improvement in 
corporate performance, and there are no clear incentives to create value for other shareholders. In 
addition, the takeover market cannot function properly, as the potential acquirer cannot realize 
the improved future profit stream by selling the shares through private transfer in the future. Our 
findings indicate that market forces are necessary for the share prices, whether observed from 
stock exchanges or private transfers, to reflect earnings information. The government 
involvement, including direct or indirect shareholdings and approval process, causes stock 
illiquidity and hence is detrimental in the ability of prices to impound earnings information. 
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the regulation 
and practice of the transfer of state and legal-person shares in China. Section 3 discusses the 
hypotheses, Section 4 presents the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Regulation and practice of the transfer of non-floating shares 
2.1. China’s split share structure 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, many of China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were 
converted to stock companies as part of the country’s transformation from a planned economy to 
a mixed economy. In the beginning, all SOE shares were state-owned shares (referred to 
hereafter as state shares for simplicity). Then, to raise more capital, many SOEs were allowed to 
issue additional shares to “legal persons,” including township and village enterprises, privately-
owned enterprises, and foreign companies. Before a company is listed, the equity of state and 
legal person shareholders (refer to as LP shareholders) is converted into shares of the listed 
company based on the reappraised value of the net assets. 
When the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges opened in 1992, the government 
insisted on having majority control of most listed companies. To ensure this, the original state 
and LP shares were designated as non-floating so that they could not fall into the hands of 
private individuals. Only shares that are sold to the public through IPOs or right issues are 
floating. Thus, the split share structure, in which there are two separate classes of stock (floating 
vs. non-floating), was in place from the beginning of China’s stock market. The non-floating 
shares are either held by the state or legal persons. The floating shares consist of “A-shares” that 
are traded by domestic investors in Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, “B-shares” that are 
traded by foreign investors in the same two exchanges, and “H-shares” that are traded in Hong 
Kong’s stock market. 
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Figure 1 shows the breakdown of the various types of shares. It is seen that the state 
remains the largest shareholder of listed companies (from an average of 41% in 1998 to 22% in 
2008). In addition, the shares of legal persons are also significant, as together the state and legal 
persons control more than 50% of all shares issued on average, and these shares are not floating. 
The floating A-shares, B-shares, and H-shares account for less than 50% of total shares. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
The split structure of non-floating and floating shares has led to at least two serious 
problems. First, because the supply of floating shares is limited, their prices are highly inflated. 
Most of shares initially offered are oversubscribed several hundred times.
1
 The high demand for 
shares is also reflected in the unreasonably high P/E ratios, which averaged 34.18 in 1998, 
gradually climbed to 58.21 in 2000, and leveled off to the mid-30’s afterwards. The second 
problem is that the stock prices do not serve the function of rewarding good and disciplining 
poor performance. When a firm performs well, the controlling shareholders, who typically own 
non-floating shares, cannot benefit by selling their shareholdings to the public market. When the 
firm performs poorly, potential acquirers cannot take over the company by open market 
purchases, because the majority of shares are in the hands of the state and legal persons. This 
conflict of interest between non-tradable shareholders and tradable shareholders results in serious 
agency problems (Huang and Fung 2005) and the problem is proved to be eased after the 
conversion of non-floating shares to floating shares (Tseng 2012). 
2.2 Conversion of non-floating shares 
Chinese government has for several years been attempting to resolve the issues that were 
caused by the split share structure. After almost three years’ deliberation and consultation, the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued a guideline in April 2005 to reform the 
                                                 
1
 The subscription ratio of IPOs was more than 200 in 1998 and 1999, and more than 300 in 2000 and 2001. 
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split share structure by converting the non-floating shares into floating. The reform guideline 
allows non-floating and floating shareholders to decide between themselves the acceptable 
compensation that the former group has to pay to the latter to convert non-floating shares into 
floating (Firth et al. 2010, Chen et al. 2011, Li et al. 2011 and among others). As shown in 
Figure 1, the ownership percentage of state and LP shares dilutes significantly since 2005 
because state and LP shareholders have to offer some shares to existing floating shareholders as 
a compensation for the conversion of non-floating shares into floating. As of the end of 2006, all 
but 40 of the 1,341 listed companies have completed the conversion process.  
It is reasonable to assume that, before the split share structure reform, neither party in the 
transfer of non-floating shares would anticipate the conversion of non-floating shares in the 
foreseeable future. Therefore, there is a clear distinction in the non-floating stock liquidity before 
and after the split share structure reform. However, the new CSRC guideline has not brought 
about the immediate conversion of most non-floating shares, because the guideline stipulates that 
once the non-floating shares of a company have been approved to become floating by 
shareholders, the holders of those shares must pledge not to sell them for at least 12 months. 
They must also pledge that after the initial 12-month period, they will not sell more than 10% of 
their shares in the next 24 months.
2
 Thus, even after the initiation of the non-floating share 
reform in April 2005, the full floating of the non-floating shares is still many years away. 
2.3 Regulation and reporting requirements for share transfers 
The transfer of state shares (owned by government agencies and SOEs) and the transfer 
of LP shares (owned by private entities, including township and village enterprises, privately-
                                                 
2
 These lockup restrictions are expected to have different impact on liquidity of shares. For example, shares with a 
lock up period of 3 years are less liquid than those with a lock up period of only 1 year left. However, we are not 
able to collect such data and hence it will be a limitation of this study. We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for 
pointing out this. 
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owned enterprises, and foreign companies) are governed by different agencies and rules. The 
State Assets Management Bureau (SAMB, an agency under the Ministry of Finance) or its 
provincial branches exercise the control rights over state shares.
3
 According to several rules on 
the transfer of non-floating shares, state shares can be transferred to other government agencies, 
legal entities, and foreign investment firms.
4
 The transfer is subject to the approval of the SAMB 
or its provincial branches. The transfer price should be based on firm fundamentals such as net 
book value per share, return on equity (ROE), return on investment (ROI), recent market price, 
and a reasonable price-to-earnings ratio. In addition, the price must be higher than the net book 
value per share to protect the state’s interests.5 The system for the transfer of LP shares is much 
less restrictive. Governmental approval is not needed. In addition, there are no specific rules 
governing the pricing of LP shares. Thus, the pricing mechanisms of state and LP shares are not 
the same, and will be analyzed separately. 
The disclosure of the transfer of both state and LP shares is regulated by the Securities 
Law that was enacted in 1998, and a CSRC ordinance that was issued in 2002.  If the shares 
transferred account for more than 5% of total shares, then the transfer has to be disclosed in a 
newspaper that is authorized by the CSRC within three days of transfer. In practice, some 
companies voluntarily disclose the transactions even when the transfer ratio is less than the 5% 
threshold. The disclosure generally includes the name of the company whose shares are being 
transferred, the names and brief description of both parties, whether they are related parties, 
whether there is a change in the nature of shares, the transfer price, the number of shares being 
                                                 
3
 The SAMB was elevated to ministerial level in 2003 as the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC). 
4
 These include Notice on the Problems of Offering and Transferring State Shares and Opinions on the Exercise of 
the Shareholder Rights by the State Shareholders issued by the SAMB in 1994 and 1997, respectively. Starting from 
November 2002, foreign entities are allowed to buy non-floating shares. 
5
 A regulation that was issued in 1997 also loosened the state’s control of listed companies; the state no longer needs 
to hold a majority of shares after the transfer. This rule allows the government to phase out its ownership of 
industries that are not monopolistic. 
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transferred, the percentage of shares transferred of the total shares outstanding, and the top ten 
shareholders before and after the transfer. The disclosure on the change in the nature of shares 
allows us to identify whether a government entity is involved in the transfer, since it reveals the 
official classification of the shares.  
2.4 Description of transfer price data 
We obtain the sample and all relevant data from CSMAR, a database of China’s listed 
companies. The database includes all announcements of share transfers made according to 
statutory requirements as described in the previous subsection. There are 1,501 cases of 
completed transfer with relevant transfer price and financial data information included in the 
CSMAR database from 1998 to 2008. Panel A of Table 1 shows the sample distribution in 
frequency, percentage of shares transferred and transfer price by year. The majority of share 
transfers happened during the six-year period from 2001 to 2006. There is a significant drop of 
share transfers in 2007 and 2008 because the majority of firms already finished the split share 
structure reform and hence they were reluctant to do private transfer in anticipation of public 
trading after the reform. There are very few private transfers after 2008 since the CSRC ordered 
shareholders to sell stocks on exchanges’ block trading system if they expect to sell a large 
amount of shares freed from the lock-in period. The percentage of shares transferred ranges from 
11.44% in 2007 to 20.55% in 2000, with an average of 13.30% during the sample period. The 
average transfer price is about 2.51 Chinese Renminbi. Of the 1,501 share transfers, 1,143 
incurred before the split share structure reform (abbreviated as SSSR in all the tables) and 358 
ones incurred after the reform. Untabulated statistics show that the percentage of shares 
transferred after the reform is significantly lower than that before the reform (the Wilcoxon z-
score is 3.60 with a significance level of 1%). It also reports that among the 1,501 transactions, 
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629 are transfers of state shares. They are sold by government agencies or SOEs and subject to 
the approval of the SAMB. They are in contrast to the 872 transfers of LP shares that were sold 
by legal persons. Untabulated statistics show that transfers of state shares involving government 
entities tend to account for larger percentage of total shares (the Wilcoxon z-score is 12.60 with a 
significance level of 1%). 
Panel B of Table 1 further shows that there are a total of 577 unique firms which are 
involved in share transfers in the 11-year period. Majority of the sample firms (353 out of 577) 
engaged in one or two transactions each in the sample period (213 firms with one transaction 
each and 140 firms with two transactions each). The remaining 224 sample firms engaged in 
three or more share transfers each.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 2 shows the median statistics of the transfer and market prices, together with the 
price-multiples and ROEs. The market price (MP) is the A-share stock price on the day the 
transfer agreement is reached as stated in the announcements. In measuring the price-to-book 
(P/B) ratio, the book value of equity on the most recent balance-sheet date is used. In measuring 
the price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio, either most recent annual earnings or two most recent 
semiannual earnings are used.
6
 Panel A of Table 2 shows that, for the whole sample, the median 
ratio of MP to TP is 3.87. Thus the transfer prices are only a fraction of the market prices, which 
is consistent with the findings in Chen and Xiong (2002). The median P/B ratio based on transfer 
                                                 
6
 Chinese companies reported their financial results semiannually before the first quarter of 2002 and quarterly 
thereafter. The annual report is due at the end of April (all firms use calendar year) and the semiannual report at the 
end of August. All of the past annual earnings data that are used in this study are the trailing earnings in the two 
most recent interim periods. There are three situations: if the transfer date is before April 30, then the earnings of the 
first half of the previous year and the second half of the year before are used as the trailing earnings; if the transfer 
date is between May and August, then the annual earnings of the previous year are used; and if the transfer date is 
after August, then the earnings of the first half of the same year and the second half of the previous year are 
combined. The book value of equity is derived from the most recent annual or interim report. In the periods after 
2002 when quarterly reports were available, we continue to use semiannual approach for consistency. That is, we 
combine the first two quarters as the first interim period and the last two quarters as the second interim period. 
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prices is 1.04, while the median P/B ratio based on market prices is 3.83. The median P/E, in 
contrast, is 11.29 based on transfer prices and 42.50 based on market prices. The median return 
on equity (ROE) is 4.56% for all sample firms.   
Since there are more floating shares after the split share structure reform, market prices 
will be adjusted downward accordingly. Thus, as shown in Panel B of Table 2, the market-to-
transfer price ratio (MP/TP) and all the market price multiples (Market P/B and Market P/E) are 
significantly lower after the reform. However, we find that the transfer P/B and P/E before and 
after the reform are indifferent. It also shows that firms transferred before the reform are more 
profitable in terms of ROE than these transferred shares after the reform. It may due to the fact 
that, with the anticipation of public trading after the reform, profitable firms are less likely to 
transfer shares privately because they can negotiate for higher premium by trading on the market. 
The last panel of Table 2 also shows that, relative to the transfer of LP shares which 
involves mainly private entities, transfers of state shares involving government entities tend to 
have lower MP/TP ratio. In addition, the transfer price-to-book multiple (Transfer P/B) is higher 
in transfers of state shares. This is likely due to the lower bound of book value of equity imposed 
on the transfers of shares held by government entities. The rest of the statistics are statistically 
indifferent.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
 
3. Development of hypotheses 
Together with the market prices observed from the stock market, there are in total three 
distinct types of pricing in China’s stocks: transfer prices of state shares; transfer prices of LP 
shares and market prices of floating shares. The major difference among the three types is the 
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liquidity of the shares that are transferred or traded. The first two types are transfers of non-
floating shares and hence they are less liquid than the last type (market prices) which are driven 
by market forces. Among the transfers of non-floating shares, the liquidity of transfers of state 
shares is more illiquid than that of transfers of LP shares because transfers of state shares must 
be approved by the Chinese government and are subject to price regulations.  
The effects of liquidity on the transfer pricing mechanism can be discussed within the 
framework of residual income valuation model (Ohlson 1995) which is presented below:
7
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The model decomposes the firm’s equity value (MV0) at time 0 into two parts: book value of 
equity at time 0 (BV0) and present value of expected future residual income which is measured as 
the difference between earnings (Et) and normal earnings (r*BVt-1). The model indicates that the 
value of the firm would depend more on the value of the expected future residual income (and 
earnings) if Et > r*BVt-1. If Et < r*BVt-1, then the value of the firm will depend more on BV0, the 
book value of equity. 
When shares are not liquid, the cost of capital (the discount rate r in eq. (1)) will be 
higher for at least two reasons. First, owners of illiquid shares cannot diversify away the firm-
specific risk. Thus, the cost of capital must be augmented by a non-negative firm-specific risk 
premium (e.g., Feldman 2005). Second, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) postulate that the owners 
of illiquid shares have to incur additional trading costs, including those related to searching, 
negotiation, and transaction, to transfer shares. They show a significant effect of their measure of 
                                                 
7
 The Ohlson model is derived from the Gordon growth model or dividend discount model. We don’t use Gordon’s 
model because we intent to explicitly present the impacts of book value and earnings on market value separately.  
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illiquidity (i.e., the bid-ask spread) on realized returns. Thus, the pricing mechanism that is 
indicated by eq. (1) will be significantly affected by the level of illiquidity. 
For non-floating shares in China before the reform, private transfer is the only way to sell 
such shares. This illiquidity constraint increases the cost of capital and reduces the importance of 
earnings. In other words, earnings are expected to play a less significant role in transfer prices 
than in market prices. In addition, within non-floating shares, the state shares are less liquid than 
LP shares since the transfer of state shares require approval.
8
 Hence we expect earnings to play a 
less significant role in transfer prices of state shares than in LP shares. Thus, in the valuation 
model, the coefficients on earnings are expected to be different when the market prices of 
floating shares or the transfer prices of non-floating shares are used as the dependent variable. 
The expected order of the coefficients can be summarized in the following hypotheses: 
H1: Before the share structure reform, the coefficient on earnings in the valuation model is 
higher when the market price of floating A shares is used as the dependent variable than 
when the transfer prices of non-floating state and LP shares are the dependent variable.  
 
H2: Before the share structure reform, the coefficient on earnings in the valuation model is 
higher when the transfer price of non-floating LP shares is used as the dependent variable 
than when the transfer price of non-floating state shares is the dependent variable. 
 
After the share structure reform, we expect H1 to continue to hold, but not H2. As 
discussed in Section 2.2, after the reform, the floating of state and LP shares is subject to a one- 
to three-year holding period. These shares are still less liquid compared with the floating shares. 
                                                 
8
 In addition to the illiquidity impact, the price regulation on state share transfers also contributes to the less 
importance of earnings in valuation. As mentioned earlier, the transfer price of state shares cannot be lower than the 
book value of equity. If the intrinsic value of shares (as considered by the buyer or the seller) is lower than the book 
value, the shares have to be transferred at the book value. If the intrinsic value of shares is higher than the book 
value of equity, managers of government-controlled firms might not have incentives to negotiate a price that is 
higher than book value. 
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Thus, the prediction of H1 should continue to hold after the reform. However, after the reform, 
the transfer of state shares no longer needs governmental approval and there is no longer 
limitation of the transfer price. There should be no difference in the pricing mechanisms of state 
and LP shares.
 9
 Thus, the prediction of H2 would no longer apply after the reform.  
4. Empirical Results 
4.1  Regression model 
We employ the following model to test the impact of book value and earnings on stock 
price: 
 PPSit =  +  EPSit +  BVPSit +  
where PPSit is the equity price per share, EPSit is earnings, BVPSit is the book value of equity, all 
on a per share basis, for firm i in period t.
10
 Current earnings measure is used because it 
represents the expected future earnings if the firm continues to apply the current business 
technology. In addition, most research shows that annual earnings follow a random walk process, 
and it is difficult to improve on current earnings as a predictor of future earnings. To test the 
hypotheses, all of the transfer price data are pooled in the same regression. In testing the 
hypotheses, PPS can be the transfer price (TP) of non-floating shares or the market price (MP) of 
floating shares, which is observed on the settlement date of each transfer. Due to the high 
synchronicity of China’s stock prices, the market prices that are observed on different dates are 
influenced significantly by the market movement. We neutralize the market effects by dividing 
                                                 
9
 There was a new regulation <Temporary method on the transfer of listed company shares by state holders> 
imposed by SASAC and CSRC in 2007 (http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2007-07/09/content_677959.htm). This 
regulation requires that if state holders sold more than 5% of listed company shares within 3 consecutive years, their 
trading should be approved by the SASAC. This makes state shares more illiquid compared with LP shares, which is 
the same as the situation before the reform. However, there are very few private transfers after 2008 and we are not 
able to control for this impact in the current study. 
10
 In eq. (2), the number of shares outstanding is the deflator in all variables (or the scale variable). We choose this 
scale variable because it is recommended by Barth and Kallapur (1996, p. 556) as better than other variables such as 
book value of equity to deal with the scale issue. We alleviate the possible heteroskedasticity problems caused by 
using the per share values in the regressions by using White’s (1980) approach to calculate all the t-values reported 
in this study. 
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MP by the rebased market index on the date on which MP is observed. This adjusted market 
price measure is denoted as AMP.
11
 Because China followed a semi-annual reporting system 
during most of our study period, both BVPS and EPS are based on either the annual or semi-
annual report that is available on the date on which the transfer was announced.  
Table 3 provides the Pearson correlations of the variables that are used in the various 
specifications of eq. (2) before (upper-diagonal) and after (lower-diagonal) the split share 
structure reform. The first result worth mentioning is that, in the period before the reform, TP has 
very low correlations with MP (with a Pearson correlation of 0.09). However, their correlation in 
the period after the reform is much higher (0.48). TP is only somewhat more correlated with 
AMP (0.16 compared with 0.09) before the reform but TP has almost the same correlation with 
AMP after the reform (0.40 compared with 0.48). In addition, TP has generally higher 
correlations with BVPS than MP or AMP in both periods. Moreover, EPS and BVPS are highly 
correlated in both periods (0.54 before and 0.58 after the reform). This could partially be because 
EPS is part of BVPS. Surprisingly, in the period before the reform, the transfer prices have 
negative but very low correlation (-0.08) with the market index (INDEX), which is a rebased 
(using 1997 year-end as the base period) Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange index on the 
day on which the transfer was announced. This means that the transfer price is negatively 
affected by the overall market price level before the reform. After the reform, the transfer prices 
are positively correlated with market index (0.14), which is consistent with the liquidity impact. 
On the contrary, the market price is highly correlated with the market index in both periods (0.41 
and 0.55). All the correlation estimations are significant at a level of 0.01 using a two-tailed test. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
                                                 
11
 There are two market indices in China that cover the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. To calculate AMP, 
the market price is divided by the rebased index (defining the index at end of 1997 as 1.0) of the exchange to which 
the firm belongs. 
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4.2 Test of hypotheses: Stock liquidity and the pricing of earnings 
Stock liquidity is the main factor to derive the two hypotheses. As we discussed in the 
previous section, before the share structure reform, there is a clear liquidity difference between 
transfers of floating shares and non-floating shares. After the reform, all non-floating shares have 
been converted to floating shares and thus there should be no difference in liquidity. However, 
after conversion to floating shares, they are still subject to selling provisions (typically one to 
three years). Thus it is interesting to test the hypotheses separately in the two periods. We report 
the regression results of eq. (2) for the sample periods before and after the reform in Table 4 and 
Table 5, respectively. 
Panel A of Table 4 provides a test of H1 in the period before the reform, which predicts 
that, due to share liquidity, earnings should be more important in determining market prices than 
transfer prices. Both transfer prices (TP) and adjusted market prices (AMP) are used as the 
dependent variable in eq. (2) for all the 1,143 transfers incurred before the reform. This panel 
shows that EPS has a highly significant coefficient of 2.59 (p < 0.01 based on the White-adjusted 
t-value of 8.17) when the market price (AMP) is used as the dependent variable.
12
 This 
coefficient is significantly different from the insignificant coefficient of 0.15 on EPS in the 
regression using transfer prices as the dependent variable (with an F-statistic of 52.51). This 
large difference in the pricing of earnings reflects the effect of share illiquidity. 
The panel also shows that book value of net assets (BVPS) is an important determination 
of both the TP and AMP. Not surprisingly, the coefficient on BVPS when TP is used as 
dependent variable is significantly higher than that when AMP is used as dependent variable 
(0.62 compared with 0.40 with an F-statistic of 5.45) since TP incorporates book value 
                                                 
12
 To reduce the problems caused by extreme values, we winsorize all of the variables to within 1% and 99% of the 
values in all the regressions. 
 19 
information only whereas AMP values both the book value and earnings information. We also 
find that the adjusted R
2
 in the regression using TP as the dependent variable is much higher than 
that in the regression using AMP (41.4% vs. 13.5%). 
All the 1,143 share transfers before the reform are further divided into two groups: 522 
transfers of state shares involving government entities and 621 transfers of LP shares involving 
private entities. Using transfer prices (TP) as the dependent variable in eq. (2), we run the 
regressions for the two groups separately and the results are reported in Panel B. In the 
regression of state shares sample, the coefficient on book value is very close to one (0.79) and 
the coefficient on earnings is not significant (0.04 with a t-value of 0.32). This indicates that the 
prices of the transfers of state shares involving government entities are primarily based on the 
book value of equity. This could be due to the lower bound of book value imposed by regulations 
on the transfer prices. It could be also due to the low incentives of government agencies or SOEs 
to negotiate a transfer price that would reflect the firm’s profitability. The coefficient on EPS in 
the regression using the LP shares sample, however, is significant at the level of 0.05 (with a t-
value of 2.17). However, this coefficient is not significantly different from the coefficient on 
EPS in the regression using the state share sample based on the F-statistic of 1.57. Thus, as 
predicted by H2, earnings seem to be less important when shares are less liquid and are subject to 
governmental intervention. We believe it is due to the illiquidity of share transfers caused by 
government intervention. The insignificant difference in coefficients on earnings may be 
explained by the fact that both types of shares transferred are non-floating shares and are subject 
to severe illiquidity. The panel also shows that the coefficient estimates on book value exhibit the 
same pattern as that reported in Panel A. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
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We rerun all the regressions for the share transfers after the share structure reform to test 
whether the two hypotheses still hold. As all non-floating shares have been converted to floating 
shares, we expect both transfer prices and market prices incorporate earnings information. 
However, since the converted floating shares are still subject to trading provisions, we expect 
transfer prices to incorporate less earnings information than market prices do according to H1. At 
last, since government intervention is removed after the reform, transfer prices involving 
government entities and private entities should incorporate similar earnings information. The 
results reported in Table 5 are consistent with our predictions. As shown in Panel A of Table 5, 
both the coefficient estimates on EPS are positive and significant at the level of 1%. However, 
the coefficient estimate on EPS when TP is used as dependent variable is significantly lower than 
when AMP is used as dependent variable (0.60 compared with 2.07 with an F-statistic of 17.99). 
When we partition the sample into transfers involving government entities (state shares) and 
private entities (LP shares), as shown in Panel B, both coefficient estimates on EPS are 
significantly positive and they are insignificantly different. In summary, we find consistent 
results with H1 but not with H2 after the reform. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
4.3 Stock illiquidity and the pricing of asset quality 
The results reported above show that illiquidity of non-floating shares results in less 
earnings information and more book value information incorporated in transfer prices.
13
 The 
extent to which the transfer price depends on the book value of equity can be further detected 
                                                 
13
 According to Ohlson’s (1995) residual income model, if earnings are permanent, equity value should depend on 
earnings only; while if earnings are transitory, equity value should depend on book value of equity only. In the 
middle of these two extreme cases, the weight on earnings should increase as earnings become more persistent. 
Thus, if transfer prices reflect the different degrees of earnings persistence (a proxy for earnings quality), they 
should depend more on earnings when earnings are more persistent. In an untabulated robustness test, we classify 
samples into three groups based on the change of the firm’s return on equity. We find that earning persistence 
(proxy for earnings quality) does not change our main results. 
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from the pricing of the quality of assets. Lack of market forces to discover prices, transfer prices 
may have no ability to incorporate quality of assets and only price face value of assets. This 
inefficiency in the pricing mechanism is also due to stock illiquidity.  
Chinese accounting regulations allow the separation of two classes of assets in terms of 
quality. Chinese accounting standards require the footnote disclosure of “nonperforming assets,” 
which include receivables that are overdue for more than three years, unamortized expenses, 
deferred losses of asset sales, and capitalized startup costs. This type of asset, although 
remaining on the balance sheet according to Chinese accounting standards, should receive less 
value in the transfer than other assets. Thus, these two classes of assets are expected to receive 
different weights in the transfer pricing if the quality of assets is important.   
We disaggregate assets and rewrite eq. (2) as follows. 
 TPit =  + EPSit +   RBVPSit +  NAPSit +  
where TP is the transfer price per share and RBVPS is the book value of equity per share minus 
the nonperforming assets per share (NAPS). 
Table 6 reports the regressions based on eq. (3) for all the sample share transfers in both 
the before and after the reform periods.
 14
 It also shows the regression results by further 
decomposition of samples into transfers of state shares involving government entities and 
transfers of LP shares involving private entities. Panel A of Table 6 shows that, before the reform, 
both the coefficients on RBVPS and NAPS are significantly positive, indicating transfer prices 
before the reform do not value the quality of assets. However, after the reform, only the 
coefficient on RBVPS is significantly positive and our interpretation is that market forces of free 
trading enables the transfer prices to discover the quality of assets. The coefficients on EPS 
                                                 
14
 The sample size in Table 6 is smaller than the full sample size since some firms have missing data on current 
and/or nonperforming assets. 
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depict the same pattern as reported in Table 4 and Table 5, i.e., transfer prices incorporate less 
earnings information before the reform than after the reform. 
To further detect whether the pricing mechanisms of book value are different between 
transfers of state shares involving government entities and transfers of LP shares involving 
private entities for periods before and after the reform, we rerun all the regressions for samples 
reclassified based on transfer period (before or after the reform) and transfer type (state or LP 
shares). Panel B of Table 6 shows that, before the reform, the coefficient estimates of NAPS for 
both the state share transfers and the LP shares transfers are significantly positive and 
insignificantly different (0.89 compared with 0.62 with an F-statistic of 0.58 only). However, 
Panel C of Table 6 shows that, after the reform, the two coefficient estimates are insignificant 
and indifferent. It indicates that stock liquidity with market forces enables transfer prices to 
discount non-performing assets and hence discover the quality of assets. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
5. Conclusions 
This study focuses on one very distinct aspect of China’s stock market: its two-class 
system of shares, in which a significant portion of shares are non-floating and the remaining are 
floating on the exchange. Non-floating shares can only be transferred between government 
agencies or enterprises. Transactions that involve non-floating shares occur quite frequently, and 
during our study period from 1998-2008 we were able to obtain relevant data on 1,501 transfers 
involving 577 companies.  
We examine the effects of share liquidity on the pricing of earnings with the presence of 
government involvement prior to the split share structure reform. We find that the transfer prices 
of non-floating shares involving government (state shares) are based primarily on the book value 
of net assets without considering earnings and the quality of assets. Earnings are priced only in 
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the transfers of LP shares between private entities. However, due to the illiquidity of shares, the 
weight of earnings in valuation is much lower in transfer prices than in the market prices of 
floating shares. Thus, despite the many irregularities in China’s stock market, market prices 
generally reflect earnings information. In comparison, after the reform, earnings are priced in the 
transfers of both state and LP shares, although the weight of earnings in valuation is still less 
than that in the market prices of floating shares due to the holding period of one- to three-year 
before floating.  
Several limitations should be pointed out in interpreting the results reported in this study. 
First, this study does not consider the motivations underlying the transfers of non-floating shares 
and their impact on the pricing. This has to be deferred to future research since the motivations 
involved complex political, social and economical factors, and it is difficult to predict their 
impact on the pricing of earnings. Second, the regression models used in this study offer no 
prediction of the magnitude of the coefficient on earnings. In the U.S., attempt has been made to 
evaluate the reasonableness of valuation models such as residual income model (e.g., Dechow et 
al. 1999). But the results are mixed. It is highly unlikely that any valuation model can describe 
the stock prices of China’s fledging market with better degree of precision. Thus, it is impossible 
to judge whether earnings are properly incorporated in the transfer or market prices. 
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Figure 1 
Distribution of types of shares in China
a,b
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a
 Both state and legal-person shares were not floating on the stock exchanges before 2005. 
Since 2005, they have been gradually converted to floating shares which are subject to one- to 
three-year sale restrictions. A shares are denominated in RMB and are traded on China’s 
domestic exchanges; B shares are denominated in USD or HKD and are traded on China’s 
domestic exchanges; H shares are denominated in HKD and are traded in Hong Kong’s stock 
market. 
b
 Data sources: Website of China Securities Regulatory Commission. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of the sample 
 
Panel A: Sample year distribution 
Year Frequency 
Average transfer ratio % 
(Median) 
Average transfer price in RMB 
(Median) 
1998 16 
15.07 
(8.64) 
2.15 
(2.00) 
1999 19 
17.38 
(18.80) 
2.97 
(2.18) 
2000 28 
20.55 
(19.53) 
1.94 
(1.76) 
2001 274 
13.06 
(9.37) 
2.21 
(2.15) 
2002 269 
14.56 
(10.54) 
2.53 
(2.18) 
2003 278 
13.31 
(9.72) 
2.59 
(2.22) 
2004 226 
12.27 
(8.98) 
2.69 
(2.46) 
2005 173 
11.94 
(4.78) 
2.70 
(2.45) 
2006 178 
12.84 
(8.78%) 
2.33 
(2.10) 
2007 29 
11.44 
(9.10) 
2.96 
(1.65) 
2008 11 
14.99 
(10.55) 
4.11 
(3.92) 
Total 1501 
13.30 
(9.38) 
2.51 
（2.20） 
                 before SSSR 1143 
13.62 
(10.00) 
2.50 
(2.20) 
              after SSSR 358 
12.27 
(7.76) 
2.57 
(2.19) 
               State shares 629 
17.76 
（15.00） 
2.78 
(2.40) 
             LP Shares 872 
10.08 
(6.69) 
2.32 
(2.01) 
Panel B: Transfer frequency 
Number of transfers per 
firm, 1998-2008 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 and 
more 
Total 
 
Number of firms 213 140 88 58 32 19 27 577 
Total number 
of transfers 213 280 264 232 160 114 238 1501 
 
Note:  
SSSR refers to the split share structure reform. 
State shares are owned by government entities which include government agencies and state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). LP Shares are owned by private entities include township and village enterprises, privately-owned 
enterprises, and foreign companies. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of transfer price, market price, and price-multiples 
a 
 
Panel A: Firms with share transfer 
 MP/TP 
Transfer 
P/B 
Market 
P/B 
Transfer 
P/E 
Market 
P/E ROE(%) 
Whole sample 
(N=1501) 
 
3.87 1.04 3.83 11.29 42.50 4.56 
 
Panel B: Before vs. After SSSR (1143:358) 
Before SSSR 
(N=1143) 
4.59 1.04 4.66 11.48 53.15 5.20 
After SSSR 
(N=358) 
2.45 1.04 2.30 9.91 22.50 2.91 
 
Wilcoxon z-
statistic 
14.37
***
 -0.03 14.52
***
 1.16 6.02
***
 3.42
***
 
 
Panel C: State Shares vs. LP Shares (629:872) 
Transfers of State 
Shares (N=629) 
3.62 1.08 3.89 12.15 40.69 4.34 
Transfers of LP 
Shares (N=872) 
4.21 1.01 3.72 10.51 43.20 4.93 
 
Wilcoxon z-
statistic  
-3.79
***
 4.70
***
 0.34 1.62 0.23 -1.52 
 
a 
Variable definitions: 
TP = transfer price per share, 
MP = market price per share at the transfer agreement date, 
Transfer P/E = transfer price/earnings per share (EPS), 
Transfer P/B = transfer price/book value of equity per share (BVPS), 
Market P/E = market price/EPS, 
Market P/B = market price/BVPS, 
ROE = Return on equity. 
 
SSSR refers to the split share structure reform. 
 
**
Significant at a level of 0.01 using a one-tailed test. 
*
Significant at a level of 0.05 using a one-tailed test. 
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Table 3 
Pearson correlations of the variables used in the regressions for first period (before SSSR in 
upper diagonal) and second period (after SSSR in lower diagonal)
a 
 
 TP 
 
MP AMP EPS BVPS INDEX 
TP  0.09
***
 0.16
***
 0.38
***
 0.64
***
 -0.08
***
 
MP 
 
0.48
***
  0.90
***
 0.30
***
 0.21
***
 0.55
***
 
AMP 
 
0.40
***
 0.66
***
  0.35
***
 0.29
***
 0.17
***
 
EPS 
 
0.44
***
 0.35
***
 0.54
***
  0.54
***
 0.03
***
 
BVPS 
 
0.56
***
 0.33
***
 0.54
***
 0.58
***
  -0.08
***
 
INDEX 
 
0.14
***
 0.41
***
 -0.29
***
 -0.21
***
 -0.29
***
  
 
 
a
Variable definitions: 
TP      = transfer price, 
MP     = market price, 
INDEX  = rebased (using 1997 year-end as base period) Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
index,   
AMP    = MP / INDEX, 
EPS     = earnings per share, and 
BVPS   = book value per share. 
 
SSSR refers to the split share structure reform. 
 
***
Significant at a level of 0.01 using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 4  
Test of the valuation model, using different prices and different samples (t-statistics are reported 
in parentheses) 
a
 
 
Model: TPi (or AMPi) =  +  EPSi +  BVPSi +  
 
Dependent variable Intercept EPS BVPS 
Adj-R
2 
(%)
 
N 
 
Panel A: Before SSSR (N=1143) 
TP as dependent 
variable 
1.04 
(15.19)
***
 
0.15 
(1.58) 
0.62 
(23.04)
***
 
41.4 1143 
AMP as dependent 
variable 
7.79 
(34.7)
***
 
2.59 
(8.17)
***
 
0.40 
(4.53)
***
 
13.5 1143 
 
F-statistic testing the 
difference in pair of 
coefficients 
  
52.51
***
 
 
5.45
**
 
  
 
Panel B: State Shares vs. LP Shares (522:621) 
Transfers of State 
Shares (N=522) 
0.84 
(9.41)
***
 
0.04 
(0.32) 
0.79 
(22.71)
***
 
59.2 522 
Transfers of LP 
Shares (N=621) 
1.24 
(12.96)
***
 
0.28 
(2.17)
**
 
0.46 
(11.89)
***
 
27.8 621 
 
Wilcoxon z-statistic  
  
1.57 
 
40.21
***
 
  
 
a
 Variable definitions: 
TP      = transfer price, 
AMP    = market price/rebased market index, 
EPS  = earnings per share, and 
BVPS  = book value per share. 
 
SSSR refers to the split share structure reform. 
 
**
Significant at a level of 0.05 using a two-tailed test. 
***
Significant at a level of 0.01 using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 5  
Test of the valuation model, using different prices and different samples (t-statistics are reported 
in parentheses) 
a
 
 
Model: TPi (or AMPi) =  +  EPSi +  BVPSi +  
 
Dependent 
variable 
Intercept EPS BVPS 
Adj- R
2 
(%)
 
N 
 
Panel A:After  SSSR (N=358) 
TP as dependent 
variable 
1.78 
(13.69)
***
 
0.60 
(3.22)
***
 
0.43 
(8.61)
*** 
 
32.7 358 
AMP as dependent 
variable 
4.21 
(19.35)
***
 
2.07 
(6.65)
***
 
0.55 
(6.55)
***
 
36.5 358 
 
F-statistic testing the 
difference in pair of 
coefficients 
  
17.99
***
 
 
1.57 
  
 
Panel B: State Shares vs. LP Shares (107:251) 
Transfers of 
State Shares 
(N=107) 
2.42 
(9.07)
***
 
0.95 
(2.35)
**
 
0.39 
(4.05)
***
 
28.8 107 
Transfers of LP 
Shares (N=251) 
1.54 
(10.85)
***
 
0.53 
(2.69)
***
 
0.44 
(7.82)
***
 
36.6 251 
 
Wilcoxon z-
statistic  
  
1.03 
 
0.28 
  
 
a
 Variable definitions: 
TP      = transfer price, 
AMP    = market price/rebased market index, 
EPS  = earnings per share, and 
BVPS  = book value per share. 
 
SSSR refers to the split share structure reform. 
 
**
Significant at a level of 0.05 using a two-tailed test. 
***
Significant at a level of 0.01 using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 6 The effects of asset quality on transfer prices 
a
 
 
Model: TPi =  + EPSi +  RBVPSi +  NAPSi + i 
 
Sample partitioning Intercept 
 
EPS 
 
RBVPS 
 
NAPS 
 
Adj- R
2 
(%)
 
N 
 
 
Panel A: Before SSSR vs. After SSSR 
Before SSSR 1.01 
(14.14)
***
 
 
0.14 
(1.41) 
0.62 
(23.15)
***
 
0.87 
(4.85)
***
 
41.4 1133 
After SSSR
 
1.56 
(12.44)
***
 
 
0.62 
(3.69)
 ***
 
0.48 
(10.50)
 ***
 
0.34 
(1.12) 
41.2 336 
F-statistic testing the 
difference in pair of 
coefficients 
 7.19
 ***
 8.24
 ***
 2.73
*
   
 
Panel B: classification based on whether government involved before SSSR 
State Shares 
before SSSR 
0.83 
(8.92)
 ***
 
 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.79 
(22.57)
 ***
 
0.89 
(3.88)
 ***
 
59.2 519 
LP Shares 
before SSSR 
1.23 
(12.15)
 ***
 
0.24 
(1.87)
 *
 
0.45 
(11.89)
 ***
 
0.62 
(2.38)
 **
 
27.2 614 
 
F-statistic testing the 
difference in pair of 
coefficients 
  
1.06 
 
40.91
***
 
 
0.58 
  
 
Panel C: classification based on whether government involved after SSSR 
State Shares 
after SSSR 
2.14 
(9.35)
 ***
 
1.05 
(3.14)
 ***
 
0.43 
(5.52)
 ***
 
0.42 
(0.98) 
45.1 101 
LP Shares 
after SSSR 
1.40 
(9.41)
 ***
 
0.51 
(2.73)
 ***
 
0.48 
(8.88)
 ***
 
-0.11 
(-0.25) 
41.8 235 
 
F-statistic testing the 
difference in pair of 
coefficients 
  
2.12 
 
0.30 
 
0.78 
  
a
 Variable definitions: 
TP      = transfer price, 
EPS  = earnings per share, 
TBVPS  = book value per share minus NAPS, and 
NAPS = Non-performing assets per share. 
b 
State shares are owned by government entities include government agencies and state-own enterprises (SOEs).
 
c 
LP shares are owned by private entities include township and village enterprises, privately-owned enterprises, and 
foreign companies. 
*
, 
**
, 
*** 
Significant at a level of 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
